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On Dummett’s “Proof-Theoretic
Justifications of Logical Laws”
Warren Goldfarb
Abstract This paper deals with Michael Dummett’s attempts at a proof-theoretic
justification of the laws of (intuitionistic) logic, pointing to several critical problems
inherent in this approach. It discusses in particular the role played by “boundary
rules” in Dummett’s semantics. For a revised approach based on schematic validity
it is shown that the rules of intuitionistic logic can indeed be justified, but it is argued
that a schematic conception of validity is problematic for Dummett’s philosophy of
logic.
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Can logical laws be justified? Of course, the question can be answered, trivially, in
the affirmative: a logical law can be justified by deriving it from other logical laws.
But the question is meant to ask something deeper, something like: can the logical
laws be justified, all of them. Or, at least, can the logical laws be justified on the basis
of some small fragment of them, a fragment deductively weaker than the whole?
To this question it seems plausible that the answer is negative. Early analytic
philosophers might have argued that since the logical laws provide the canons of
justification, it does not even make sense to seek to justify them. (This view is, I
take it, near to the surface, if not completely explicit, in Frege. It is the cornerstone
of Carnap’s thought, when he takes the specification of a linguistic framework—
including all the logical laws—as a precondition for any rational inquiry or debate
at all.) This philosophical view is supported by, or mirrored in, an obvious technical
point: any justification would involve a deductive argument; this argument would
use logical laws, so that the justification would presuppose what it is supposed to
justify. Thus it would be circular, and not a justification at all. This is well illustrated
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by soundness proofs for deductive systems: ordinarily, in showing soundness of a
particular axiom or rule, one uses logical reasoning that is the direct analogue in the
metalanguage of that very axiom or rule.
Nonetheless, as Michael Dummett has long urged (see, e.g., [1]), a negative answer
might be too quick.
It might be proposed, for example, that it is the meaning of our words that have, as
upshots, the acceptability of the logical laws; might not an account of those meanings
therefore be able to play the role of supporting, or even fully justifying logical laws?
To put a finer point on it, the suggestion is that logical laws are true by dint of the
meanings of the words in them—specifically the meanings of the logical particles;
and hence one might be able to find justifications of those laws simply by unfolding
what the meanings of the logical particles are. The hope is that this might be done
without invoking the full panoply of logical laws that use those particles, so as to
obtain noncircular justifications.
In an odd sense, the idea goes back to Wittgenstein’s discovery of truth-functional
analysis: for the validity of the truth-functional laws follows at once from the stipu-
lation of the truth-functions that the connectives represent. (I say “in an odd sense”,
since for Wittgenstein the logical laws have no content, and it is surely odd to speak of
justifying something without content: what is there to justify?) But it should be noted
that a strong assumption underlies Wittgenstein’s procedure, namely his notion of
propositions as bipolar—possibly true, possibly false, and determinately either one
or the other. That is a highly suspect assumption, at least to those like Dummett
who wish to question classical two-valued logic. So perhaps the question should
be rephrased as: can we find noncircular justifications of logical laws by unfold-
ing the meanings of the logical particles, without making strong meaning-theoretic
assumptions?
Gerhard Gentzen’s work in proof theory in the 1930s proved to be suggestive
in this regard. Gentzen had developed logical systems in which the role of each
connective was isolated, so that each basic inference rule was “about” one and only
one connective. Indeed, he showed that two sorts of rules for each connective suffice.
One sort allows for the introduction of the connective, and one for its elimination.
In the context of a system for natural deduction (rather than in Gentzen’s sequent
calculus), the rule of ∧-introduction is that which licenses the inference of A ∧ B
from premises A and B; the rules of ∧-elimination license the inference of A from
A ∧ B and of B from A ∧ B. The rule of →-introduction is the rule of discharge
of premises: if B has been deduced from premises including A, then we may infer
A → B while striking A from the list of premises. The rule of →-elimination is just
modus ponens, licensing the inference of B from A and A → B. Gentzen suggested
that introduction rules have much the same status as definitions: they fix the meaning
of the connectives they introduce, at least in part. That is, an introduction rule for
a connective gives the conditions under which a statement with that connective as
its main connective can be inferred. Those conditions can be thought of as simply
stipulated, and once stipulated, as constitutive of the meaning of the connective.
With respect to the project of justifying logical laws on the basis of the meaning
of the logical particles, if we accept this view of introduction rules then clearly those
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rules stand in no further need of justification. As Dummett puts it, they are “self-
justifying”. The question then is whether such self-justifying rules can be used to
endow further logical rules with justification, in particular, rules beyond those that
amount to iterated use of introduction rules.
In Chaps. 11–13 of The Logical Basis of Metaphysics [3], Michael Dummett
formulates a method for providing what he argues are just such justifications. The
introduction rules for the connectives are taken as furnishing the canonical means of
establishing sentences whose main connectives are one of those the rules introduce.
Dummett’s method then seeks to show, of an inference, that any canonical argument
for the premises of the inference can be transformed into a canonical argument for the
conclusion. Dummett’s claim is that if this can be shown, the inference is justified.
The clearest illustrative case is an inference by an elimination rule, say, an infer-
ence from F ∧ G to G. A canonical argument for the premise F ∧ G would end
in an application of the rule of ∧-introduction, that is, would end in an inference of
F ∧ G from F and G. But then the argument already contains a canonical argument
for G. Thus, the inference is justified, since we can transform the given argument
for F ∧ G into a canonical argument for G simply by extracting the subargument
for G. The basic idea here stems from Gentzen’s [6] technique of normalization of
proofs, which he devised to prove his cut-elimination theorem. Dummett’s use of
the technique as a justificatory procedure is inspired by a similar proposal of Dag
Prawitz from the early 1970s (especially in [7]), although there are differences in
formulation and in scope.
This method of justifying logical laws is important to Dummett for several rea-
sons. First, it provides a sense in which logical inferences can be justified, in a
way that is clearly noncircular, and so stills the doubt I mentioned at the start as to
whether any such program could make sense. Moreover, although the method pre-
supposes the self-justifying nature of introduction rules, and so relies on a view of the
meaning-endowing nature of those rules, the method need not invoke a full-fledged
and comprehensive theory of meaning, as Dummett’s better-known arguments crit-
icizing classical logic and supporting intuitionistic logic do. Since we seem to be
no closer to obtaining a comprehensive Dummettian theory of meaning for natural
language than we were when Dummett formulated his meaning-theoretic program
25 years ago, this avoidance of invoking such a theory makes the method more cred-
ible and presumably less open to controversy.
As it turns out, or so Dummett asserts, the method provides justification for intu-
itionistic logic but not for classical logic, at least not for the classical laws about
negation. Thus it gives important support to his position that intuitionistic logic is
preferable to classical. Indeed, it exhibits a virtue of intuitionistic logic—justifiability
on the basis of laws that merely express the meaning of the connectives—that clas-
sical logic fails to have: “[Intuitionistic logic’s] logical constants can be understood,
and its logical laws acknowledged, without appeal to any semantic theory and with
only a very general meaning-theoretical background.” [3, p. 300] The failure of this
method for the laws of classical negation thus allows an invidious distinction to be
made.
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In this paper I investigate Dummett’s method, as it applies to sentential logic.1
I shall show that, even in this restricted domain, Dummett’s method won’t do: it
provides “justifications” for obviously invalid inferences. I shall consider how to
repair the damage, and analyze the question of whether the repair restores confidence
in the philosophical framework underlying Dummett’s claim that his method does
indeed justify. The results are, I think, suggestive of some overlooked, and possibly
deep, difficulties in Dummett’s overarching project of marrying intuitionism and a
verificationistic theory of meaning.
1 Analysis of the Method
In order to make the method precise, we must define the notion of a canonical argu-
ment, for, to repeat, the idea is that an inference is justified if any canonical argument
for its premises can be transformed into a canonical argument for its conclusion. The
definition should make plausible the following: if a logically complex proposition
is provable at all, then it could in principle be proved by a canonical argument. For
only if that condition is met will Dummett’s procedure have any plausible claim to
justificatory force. In line with the underlying idea, it might be tempting to define a
canonical argument as one composed only of introduction rules. This does not work,
however, because of the nature of the introduction rule for the conditional, to wit:
F → G may be inferred from a subsidiary argument from premise F to conclusion
G, discharging the premise F . Since F itself may be logically complex, the argument
from F to G cannot be restricted to those that use introduction rules only, or else
many elementary logical truths will not be obtainable by canonical arguments, for
example, A ∧ B → B. That is, a canonical argument will end in →-introduction:
[A ∧ B]
B
A ∧ B → B
But if we are constrained to using only introduction rules, we will not be able to fill
in the middle part. Hence the subsidiary arguments, the ones starting from premises
that will eventually be discharged, cannot be constrained to contain only introduction
rules. All that can be required of such subsidiary arguments is that they themselves be
already recognized as justified. The result is a definition, by simultaneous induction
on the complexity of the statements in the arguments, of the notion of “valid canonical
argument” along with the notion of “valid argument”:
1Dummett actually proposes the method for full first-order logic. Moreover, he aims at definitions
that could apply to arbitrary new connectives, as well as our familiar ones.
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A valid canonical argument is a deduction whose premises are all atomic
sentences and that uses only introduction rules except when auxiliary premises
are introduced; at any point when such are introduced, the subargument from
the point of the introduction of the first new premise to the last step before the
discharge of the last new premise must be a valid argument.
A valid argument is an inference I such that any valid canonical argument
(i.e., any valid canonical argument with any atomic premises) for the premises
of I can be transformed into a valid canonical argument, with the same atomic
premises, for the conclusion of I .
We have simplified matters slightly by omitting what Dummett calls “boundary
rules”, which allow the inference of one atomic sentence from others.2 For example,
these may be empirical laws, connecting the primitive notions of the vocabulary.
Dummett allows the employment of such rules in valid canonical arguments. For the
moment we take there to be no such rules, since the mathematics is clearer without
them. In the next section, we shall allow boundary rules and investigate their impact.
The validity of an argument depends only on its premises and conclusion, and
not on any intervening steps. Hence the second definition is framed as applying
to inferences, rather than deductions. The simultaneous induction works because
discharge of premises increases logical complexity. Thus, whether a deduction with
conclusion F is a valid canonical argument depends on the validity of arguments
whose premises and conclusion are of strictly lesser logical complexity than F .
These definitions are far from transparent. Applying them involves tracking
through the tree structures of deductions in natural deduction systems. Most impor-
tantly, the definitions do not readily yield any general information about the range
of inferences that are valid or not.
However, the definitions can be greatly clarified if we focus not on the proof-
theoretic layout but rather on the relation that holds between a set α of atomic
sentences and a formula F when there is a valid canonical argument with conclusion
F and premises among the atomic sentences in α. Let us use “α  F” for this
relation. Using this notation we may frame the definition of “valid” thus: an inference
from premises F1, . . . , Fn to conclusion G is valid iff, for all sets α, if α  Fi for
each i , then α  G. (It may seem that this reformulation ignores a constructivity
requirement, implicit in the phrase “we can transform” of the original definition.
However, since we are dealing with sentential logic only, all notions are decidable
and all quantifiers in the metalanguage are constructively evaluable.)
We can now investigate the relation α  F , by looking at how its behaviour
for logically complex F depends on its behaviour on the constituents of F . A valid
canonical argument for F ∧ G is just a valid canonical argument for F and a valid
canonical argument for G, put together by means of a final inference to F ∧G, using
the rule of ∧-introduction. A valid canonical argument for F ∨ G is either a valid
canonical argument for F followed by one application of ∨-introduction or else a
2These amount to the definitions given by Dummett in [3, p. 261], simplified by the absence of
boundary rules and (more importantly) of the need to deal with free variables.
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valid canonical argument for G followed by one application of ∨-introduction. These
observations immediately yield:
α  F ∧ G iff α  F and α  G (1)
α  F ∨ G iff α  F or α  G (2)
A valid canonical argument for F →G with atomic premises in α is a valid inference
I to G from premises F and members of α, followed by an application of →-
introduction, discharging the premise F and yielding F → G. The inference I will
be valid provided that every valid canonical argument for F whose premises may
include members of α and possibly some other atomic sentences can be transformed
into a valid canonical argument for G whose premises are either in α or are among
those others. This yields the condition:
α  F → G iff ∀β(if α ⊆ β and β  F, then β  G). (3)
(1)–(3) show that the relation  is, in fact, a familiar one from the semantics of
intuitionistic logic, since they are nothing other than rules for the treatment of the
connectives in the usual Kripke model semantics, when we take the sets α of atomic
sentences as the nodes (worlds) of the model, and the relation α ⊆ β as the relation
of extension. Thus the proof-theoretic trappings of Dummett’s presentation conceal
a notion whose structure is the same as the standard model-theoretic or semantic one.
One connective remains to be considered, namely, negation. As Dummett notes,
the only way to treat negation that is consonant with his general procedure is to take
¬F as an abbreviation for (F →⊥), where ⊥ is a sentential constant governed by the
following introduction rule: from premises that are all the atomic sentences, it may
be inferred. Dummett allows there to be infinitely many atomic sentences; in fact,
this treatment of negation fares poorly if there are not. For if A1, . . . , An exhaust
the atomic sentences, then the introduction rule just mentioned yields the validity
of inferring ¬(A1 ∧ . . . ∧ An) with no premises. Thus on logical grounds alone we
would be able to infer that not every atomic statement is true, and this is surely an
unacceptable result.
If there are infinitely many atomic sentences, then this treatment of negation can
most easily be incorporated into our forcing relation by requiring that the domain
of sets of atomic sentences α that we consider is always finite. Then the stipulation
above becomes:
α  ⊥ for no α. (4)
The resulting rule for negation is then: α  ¬F iff ∀β(if α ⊆ β then not β 
F). This is just the standard rule for the treatment of negation in the semantics of
intuitionistic logic.
The characterization of the forcing relation will be complete once we give the
clause governing atomic sentences themselves. Since we are at the moment allowing
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no boundary rules, we have:
for any atomic sentence A, α  A iff A ∈ α. (5)
As we’ve just seen, Dummett’s notion of valid canonical model yields a relation
 that obeys just the usual semantic rules for models of intuitionism, as given by
(1)–(4). However, there is a key difference between  as used in Dummett’s method
and the ordinary model-theory of intuitionistic logic. In the latter, the validity of
an inference would mean that at each node (world) in every Kripke model, if the
premises are true then the conclusion is true. Dummett’s method, in contrast, amounts
to considering only one particular structure, the Kripke model in which every finite
set of atomic sentences is a distinct node, and for every finite set of atomic sentences
there is exactly one node at which all and only those sentences are true, namely, the
node that is the set of those sentences. This restriction to one particular structure
yields anomalous results.
Counterexample 1 If F does not contain ⊥, then the inference from no premise to
¬¬F is valid.
Proof It is easily shown by induction on the construction of F that if F does not
contain ⊥ then for every α there exists β with α ⊆ β and β  F . But then for no γ
do we have γ  ¬F . Hence, for every α, α  ¬¬F . 
By the way, since we have shown that, for F that do not contain ⊥, γ  ¬F for
no F , we also have the conclusion that, for such F and any G, the inference from no
premises to ¬F → G is valid.
Counterexample 2 Let F be a sentence not containing ⊥ and G a sentence having
no atomic sentences in common with F. Then the inference from premise F → G to
conclusion G is valid.
Proof Suppose α  F → G; we must show α  G. By (3), for any β with α ⊆ β, if
β  F then β  G. Moreover, as noted in the previous proof, there exists a β such
that α ⊆ β and β  F .
The following is easily shown by induction on the construction of sentences: for
any sentence H and any sets γ and δ, if A ∈ γ iff A ∈ δ for all atomic sentences A
that occur in H , then γ  H iff δ  H .
Thus, if β ′ is the subset of β containing just those atomic sentences either in α or
occurring in F , we have A ∈ β iff A ∈ β ′ for all A that occur in F . Since β  F ,
it follows that β ′  F . Hence β ′  G. Since F and G have no atomic sentence in
common, no atomic sentence occurring in G is in β ′ − α. Thus A ∈ β ′ iff A ∈ α
for all A that occur in G. Hence α  G. 
Thus there are many inferences that turn out valid under Dummett’s definition,
and yet are logically valid in no plausible sense. The counterexamples show that such
inferences exist even in the fragment of the language that does not contain ⊥, and so
does not contain negation. As a particularly vivid case, we have the validity of the
inference from A → B to B whenever A and B are distinct atomic sentences! We
must conclude that Dummett’s method has no justificatory force whatsoever.
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2 Boundary Rules
To see how the trouble arises in terms of canonical arguments, rather than the relation
, it is helpful to consider the case of the inference from A → B to B, where A and
B are distinct atomic sentences. If there were to be a valid canonical argument for
A → B, it would have to enable us to transform any valid canonical argument for
A into one for B. Since B is atomic, the only valid canonical argument for B is the
one-step argument of taking B as a premise. Hence a valid canonical argument for
A → B must have B as an (undischarged) premise; and so it will be transformable
into a valid canonical argument for B. The problem, in short, is that there is no way
of getting from A to B, except by taking B as premise.
Here, it might be thought, is where Dummett’s boundary rules can play a role,
since boundary rules license inferences from atomic formulas to atomic formulas.
However, three considerations—one technical and two philosophical—show that the
problems in the method cannot be avoided by boundary rules as Dummett envisages
them.
First, if the counterexamples are to be avoided, there are going to have to be an
inordinate number of boundary rules. To forestall the validity of the inference from
A → B to B, there must be a rule allowing the inference of B from A (and possibly
other premises not including B) for any pair (A, B) of distinct atomic sentences. To
forestall the validity of the inference from no premise to ¬¬A, there must be a rule
allowing the inference of ⊥ from A (again, possibly with other premises). Rules that
avoid some anomalies may engender others. For example, if ⊥ can be inferred by
boundary rules from premises A and B, and from premises A and C , but not from
A and any other premises, then although the inference from no premise to ¬¬A
is no longer valid, the inference from ¬A to B ∨ C is. It appears, then, that it is
unreasonable to expect that boundary rules will avoid the difficulty.
(By the way, it is not clear that a rule allowing the inference of ⊥ from atomic
premises should count as a boundary rule at all. Dummett characterizes boundary
rules as “rules governing . . . non-logical expressions.” Allowing ⊥ as a conclusion
violates this description. After all, a rule allowing the inference of ⊥ from premises
A and B is just a rule allowing the inference of ¬B from A, and of ¬A from B.
This significantly weakens the claim that ⊥ is given meaning only by its introduction
rule; indeed, it seems to me to weaken the contrast Dummett makes between intu-
itionistic negation and classical, saying of the latter “there is no way of attaining an
understanding of the classical negation operator if one does not have it already” [3,
p. 299] Nonetheless, if we are to block the anomalies given by Counterexample 1,
we must allow boundary rules with conclusion ⊥.)
Alongside the technical difficulties there are philosophical ones. To use boundary
rules in the manner envisioned makes the validity of inferences dependent on which
boundary rules there are, and hence, in particular, on empirical claims about the
connections of different empirical basic sentences. This is not consistent with the
claim that the validity of the logical inferences comes only from the meaning of the
logical connectives (as based on the introduction rules).
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Finally, even if the latter difficulty is set aside, there is another disturbing con-
sequence, namely, that it becomes impossible to put forth a link between atomic
sentences as a supposition, and draw consequences from it. For either the link is
taken as a boundary rule, and hence becomes part of the logical framework, usable
in any argument anywhere and playing a role in the criterion of validity; or else there
is no link, in which case having A → B as a supposition yields B as a valid conclu-
sion, and therefore we can infer from the conditional everything that is yielded by its
consequent alone. The irony here is that we have landed in a position akin to Frege’s
odd-sounding view that “Only true thoughts can be premises of inferences.” [5,
p. 335]3
The true nature of the difficulty should be apparent, by now. The intuitionist
reading of F → G is, roughly, “from any demonstration of F we can obtain a
demonstration of G.” In Brouwer and the early intuitionistic tradition, the notion
of demonstration here is taken to be open-ended, identified not with any particular
formal system, indeed, not with the entirety of means of demonstration we currently
have at our disposal, but as anything that we might come to accept as a demonstration.
In later studies, particularly those inspired by Kreisel’s work of the 1950s, the gen-
erality in talking of “any demonstration” is expressed by speaking of the intuitionist
→ as being “impredicative”: F → G implicitly quantifies over all demonstrations,
including those that may contain the very demonstration of F → G. Dummett, in
contrast, wants to read “any demonstration” here as meaning “any valid canonical
argument”, where this notion is defined in an inductive and hence purely predicative
way. It is this restriction that gives rise to the difficulties above, both in the case
without boundary rules, and the peculiarities of trying to use a fixed set of boundary
rules to block those difficulties.
It is I think far more natural to use the notion of boundary rule in a way not
envisaged by Dummett, and in fact inconsistent with Dummett’s aim. The definition
of “valid” can be revised so that what counts as a valid inference is one that was
valid in the old sense given any assumption of boundary rules.4 This revision avoids
both of the philosophical difficulties just canvassed. It does not restrict allowable
arguments to a fixed set of accepted ones, but rather allows any collection of possible
arguments from atomic sentences to atomic sentences. Since all sets of boundary rules
are considered, there is no need for empirical input to determine which boundary
rules should be adopted.
Technically, the consideration of all sets of boundary rules amounts to the con-
sideration of different model-theoretic structures. There are two equivalent ways of
formulating this. Given a set S of boundary rules, the relation -relative-to-S, or
S as we shall write it, can be defined by appropriate changes in clauses (4) and
(5), keeping clauses (1)–(3) as is. Alternatively, (1)–(5) can be kept as is, and the
domain of sets altered to contain all and only sets α that are closed under all the
boundary rules in S and do not contain ⊥. For our purposes, the latter procedure is
more convenient. For any set α of atomic sentences, let clS(α) be the closure of α
3For Dummett’s appraisal of this view, see [4, p. 313].
4This is the idea in the work of Prawitz [7, p. 236].
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under the rules in S, that is, the smallest set β such that α ⊆ β and if S contains a
rule “infer B from A1, . . . , An” and A1, . . . , An are in β, then B is in β.
It is easy to show that every inference that is valid in the revised sense is classically
valid. Suppose the inference from premise F to conclusion G is valid in the revised
sense. Let T be a (classical) truth-assignment to the atomic sentences in F and G
under which F comes out true; we must show that G also comes out true under T .
Let S be the set of boundary rules containing “from no premise infer A” for every
atomic sentence A to which T assigns truth, and “from A infer ⊥” for every other
atomic sentence A. Obviously, there is only one set α that is closed under S and does
not contain ⊥, namely, the set of atomic sentences assigned truth by T . But then S
behaves classically on the connectives, so that α S F . Since the inference is valid
in the revised sense, α S G. Hence G is true under T .
From this we can surmise that there will be no counterexamples of the alarming
sort encountered above. However, validity in the revised sense still does not coincide
with intuitionistic validity.
Counterexample 3 Let A be an atomic sentence, and G and H any sentences. Then
the inference from premise A → (G ∨ H) to conclusion (A → G) ∨ (A → H) is
valid in the revised sense.
Proof Let S be a set of boundary rules, and supposeα is an S-closed set not containing
⊥ such that α S A → (G ∨ H). Let β be the S-closure of α ∪ {A}. If ⊥ ∈ β, then
α S A → F for every F , so α S (A → G) ∨ (A → H); hence we may suppose
⊥ /∈ β. If β S G, then α S A → G, for if γ is any S-closed extension of α with
γ S A then β ⊆ γ , so that γ S G; similarly if β S H then α S A → H ; in
either case α S (A→G)∨(A→ H). But if neither, then β is an S-closed extension
of α such that β S A while not β S G ∨ H , which contradicts the hypothesis that
α S A → (G ∨ H). 
In the usual model-theory of intuitionistic logic, say via Kripke trees, one obtains
a model of A → (G ∨ H) that is not a model of (A → G)∨ (A → H) by having two
nodes v1 and v2, one of which models A and G but not H , the other models A and
H but not G. For this it is essential that there be no u with u ≤ v1 and u ≤ v2 that
models A; for if the root of the tree is to model A → (G ∨ H) any such u would have
to model G ∨ H , and thus have to model G or model H , but every node above u
would also model G or every node would also model H , thus defeating the example.
The problem is that, using  and boundary rules, these strictures cannot be met. For
example, suppose G and H are also atomic. Using boundary rules one can insure
that there is a closed set containing A and G and a distinct one containing A and H ,
but then there will also be a closed set containing A that is a subset of each of those,
and in order to insure that A → (G ∨ H) holds, that subset will have to contain either
G or H .
It may be helpful to translate the situation back into Dummett’s proof-theoretic
language. Again suppose G and H , as well as A, are atomic. The counterexample
shows that any valid canonical argument for A → (G ∨ H) can be transformed into
one for (A → G) ∨ (A → H). Suppose, then, there is a valid canonical argument
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from premises α to conclusion A → (G ∨ H). This is just to say that the inference
from α and A to G ∨ H is valid, which in turn means that every valid canonical
argument for α and A can be transformed into one for G ∨ H . Since there is a valid
canonical argument from α and A to α and A, there must be one from α and A to
G ∨ H . The last step of this must be an application of ∨-introduction. Hence there
is either a valid canonical argument from α and A to G or one from α and A to H ,
and so there is a valid canonical argument from α to (A → G)∨ (A → H). The idea
is that there is only one way to demonstrate A, so to speak.
3 Schematic Inferences
The counterexamples I have presented are not schematic inferences, that is, infer-
ences that rely only on the forms of the premises and conclusion. The inferences
that I showed to be valid-by-Dummett’s lights (although not valid in any ordinary
sense) were further constrained, e.g., in Counterexample 2 the formulas could have
no atomic constituent in common, and in Counterexample 3 the antecedent had to be
atomic.
The question naturally arises as to how Dummett’s definitions fare on schematic
inferences. Let us call an inference schematically valid in Dummett’s original sense
iff the inference and all its instances are valid in Dummett’s original sense. (An
instance is simply any inference obtained from the original one by replacing atomic
sentences with other sentences.)
Now any inference that is schematically valid is classically valid, since if F does
not imply G in the classical sense, a truth-assignment T that makes F true and G
false can be mimicked by the substitution instances of F and G in which sentence
letters assigned truth by T are replaced with “p → p” and those assigned falsity are
replaced with “⊥”. The resulting instances F∗ and G∗ are such that ∅  F∗ but not
∅  G∗ (since forcing will then just amount to two-valued truth-computation).
However, schematic validity outstrips intuitionistic logic.
Counterexample 45 The inference from no premise to ¬F ∨ ¬¬F is schematically
valid (that is, for any F the inference from no premise to ¬F ∨ ¬¬F is valid in
Dummett’s original sense).
Proof If not α  ¬F , then there exists β such that α ⊆ β and β  F . But then, for
any γ such that α ⊆ γ , there exists δ such that γ ⊆ δ and δ  F , namely, δ = γ ∪ β.
Thus, for any γ such that α ⊆ γ , not γ  ¬F . That is, α  ¬¬F . 
However, we can obtain a positive result if we combine the notion of schematic
inference with that of validity-in-the-revised-sense, that is, validity given any collec-
tion of boundary rules. That is, it is possible to prove the following:
5I owe this counterexample to Philip Kremer.
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Theorem If every instance of the inference from F to G is valid in the revised sense,
then the inference from F to G is intuitionistically valid.
For the proof, see the Appendix.
4 Assessment
Dummett can’t take too much comfort in this positive result. Dummett is careful
to point out, in framing his method, that the inferences treated are actual infer-
ences, involving particular meaningful sentences, the atomic components of which
are actual atomic sentences, not schematic parts [3, p. 254]. That is, he treats the lan-
guage as fully interpreted. On the view he is propounding, an inference is justified
by its validity; the justification of a schematic inference (an inference rule) can lie
only in the fact that each of its instances is justified. There is simply no room, on his
view, for a position to the effect that validity does not justify an inference unless all
inferences like it in being subsumable under a particular rule are also justified.
Let us return to Counterexample 3. Intuitionistically, the inference from A →
(G ∨ H) to (A → G) ∨ (A → H) is incorrect, because the former means “any
demonstration of A can be transformed either into one for G or into one for H”
whereas the latter means “any demonstration of A can be transformed into one for
G or any demonstration of A can be transformed into one for H .” This inference
turns out to be valid, in the revised sense, because—so to speak—the method treats
an atomic formula as its own proof. That is, the criterion of the identity of a proof
is just the atomic formulas it has as premises or are implied by its premises. Thus
distinct ways of proving an atomic A will not register as distinct. Now this view of
proofs arises because the whole set-up envisages all proofs as, ultimately from atomic
formulas. And this is the upshot of the set-up’s being part of, or the beginnings of, a
verificationist meaning-theory.
I believe the basic views that lead to Dummett’s difficulties are well exhibited in
the following remark (he is speaking here only of mathematics, but presumably he
would maintain the same for a language with empirical vocabulary as well):
If the intuitionistic explanations of the logical constants and, more generally, of the meanings
of mathematical statements are to be considered as constituting a coherent theory of meaning
for the language of mathematics, then the notion of proof which is appealed to must be such
that we can fully grasp the concept of a proof of any constituent of a given sentence in
advance of grasping that of a proof of that sentence. It cannot, therefore, be identified with
the notion of the sort of proof that we may, at some future time, come to consider valid . . .
[2, p. 402]
This remark expresses a fundamental view of Dummett’s; and from it we can see
three sources of the problems with his program for “proof-theoretic justification”.
Of course, most generally, his underlying concern to meld intuitionistic logic with
theory of meaning impels him to differ with the Brouwerian tradition of the open-
endedness of the notion of demonstration, and as we saw that was key to the anomalies
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exemplified by Counterexamples 1 and 2. But the remark also expresses Dummett’s
commitment to molecularity: that what it is to prove a sentence is explained in terms
of what it is to prove each constituent of the sentence. That, of course, is a denial of the
impredicative nature of intuitionistic conditionals; and it signals his commitment to
just the view of the proofs of atomic sentences as, if you like, logically unanalyzable,
that engenders Counterexample 3.
The difference between Dummett and the treatments of intuitionism standard in
mathematical logic on these two points has not been sufficiently explored. In classical
truth-functional semantics, atomic sentences are the basic building blocks, and it is
clear why. Dummett takes atomic sentences to be the basic building blocks of a
proof-theoretic semantics—and on both the “basic” aspect and the “building block”
aspect he differs from classical intuitionism. It is not clear why one should believe
this, except perhaps for the conflation of the notion of verification and a mathematical
notion of proof.
The third factor expressed in Dummett’s remark is that there will be no definite
meaning ascribed to a sentence unless it is fixed what a demonstration is for that
sentence. That will presuppose that not just the logical rules but also the boundary
rules are fixed. This tells us that, from Dummett’s viewpoint, the revised notion of
validity is not acceptable. For, in considering all possible boundary rules, it should
be clear, the revised notion of validity treats the atomic components of sentences
in abstraction from their actual content. It takes them to be schematic, in that their
connections to one another (and hence also to complex sentences) are varied at
will, but this is precisely what Dummett’s insistence that he seeks to justify actual
inferences, not schematic ones, would rule out.6
Finally, I suppose the following line might be taken. The claim that Dummett’s
method provides justifications of logical laws might be abandoned or weakened,
while still it be pressed that the method does show something. That, under the revised
notion of validity, the inference rules that yield valid inferences under all substitutions
are not the classical ones but precisely the intuitionistic ones, surely supports the
ascription of some advantageous status to intuitionistic logic. But here we should
note at once that the method—in taking the introductory rules as definitory of the
connectives—identifies the sense of F → G as “G can be validly inferred from
F”, and then goes on to define the latter as “every valid canonical argument for
F can be transformed into a valid canonical argument for G”. Thus, built into the
method at the start is the intuitionistic construal of the conditional. As pointed out
above, this is just what leads to condition (3) on the -relation, and that in turn is
the characteristic of the model theory of intuitionism. If (3) were to be replaced by
α  F → G iff (if α  F then α  G), then what we obtain will be a classical
6Nor is Dummett’s insistence ill-placed. The justificatory force of his method rests on what he calls
the “fundamental assumption”, that a logically complex sentence, if demonstrated, could have been
demonstrated by a (valid) canonical argument. For this reason, Dummett spends an entire chapter
of [3] investigating the exact sense and the plausibility of the fundamental assumption. Clearly, for
the fundamental assumption to make sense at all requires that the sentences about which it speaks
have content. If they are merely schemata, it is unclear what the assumption could mean, unless it
is to be true by fiat.
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notion of validity. In short, it should occasion no surprise, that the (revised) method
yields intuitionistic validity, because the method is based on, or presupposes, an
intuitionistic reading of the conditional. (Although attention is usually focused on
negation as that which marks the difference between classical and intuitionistic, a
case can be made that it’s the conditional. A classical conditional combined with the
definition of ¬F as F → ⊥ would still yield the classical laws of negation.) And
for this reason, that the method yields the intuitionistic inferences once it is applied
schematically does not signal any greater virtue of intuitionistic logic, at least as
framable from neutral ground. What is odd, and perhaps even undermining of the
claims to virtue of intuitionistic logic, is that even when the intuitionistic reading of
the conditional is built into the project at the start, it still takes lots of fussing here
and jiggling there to get the method to yield just the intuitionistic laws.
Open Access This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
Noncommercial License, which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in
any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
Appendix
Theorem Let F and G be sentential formulas such that the inference from F to G
is not intuitionistically valid. Then there are instances F∗ and G∗ of F and G, a
set S of boundary rules, and a set α of atomic sentences such that α S F∗ but not
α S G∗.
Proof Let Σ be the set of atomic sentences occurring in F or in G. Since the inference
from F to G is not intuitionistically valid, there is a Kripke tree (W,≤, I ) with root
w such that (W,≤, I ) w F but not (W,≤, I ) w G. Here (W,≤) is a tree (we
take the root as being at the bottom), and I is a mapping from W to subsets of
Σ : for each u ∈ W , I (u) is the set of atomic sentences true at u. I is subject
to the constraint that if u ≤ v then I (u) ⊆ I (v). We wish to obtain sets of atomic
sentences that “mimic” (W,≤, I ). For this we shall need additional atomic sentences
for there may be distinct nodes in W making the same atomic sentences of Σ true,
but to these nodes we want to have correspond distinct sets of atomic sentences.
For each u in W let u∗ be a distinct atomic sentence not in Σ , and for each u in
W let ϕ(u) = {v∗ | v ∈ W and v ≤ u}. ϕ(u) will be the set of atomic sentences
corresponding to the node u. We now so formulate boundary rules that the only S-
closed sets that do not contain ⊥ are precisely the sets ϕ(u) for u ∈ W . In fact, let S
be the following set of boundary rules:
“Infer ⊥ from A1, . . . , An whenever {A1, . . . , An} ⊆ ϕ(u) for no u ∈ W ; ”
“Infer v∗ from u∗ whenever u, v ∈ W and v < u.”
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Now, for each p ∈ Σ , let D(p) be the disjunction of all atomic sentences u∗ such
that p is in I (u). Finally, for any sentence H constructed from members of Σ , let
H∗ be obtained from H by replacing each atomic sentence p with D(p).
It is a routine matter to show by induction on the construction of formulas that,
for any H and any u ∈ W , (W,≤, I ) u H iff ϕ(u) S H∗. It then follows from
the supposition that ϕ(u) S F∗ but not ϕ(u) S G∗, so that the inference from F∗
to G∗ is not valid, in the revised sense. 
Author’s Postscript, January 2015
From 1999 to 2007 I presented this paper at various universities and conferences.
Often audience members raised stimulating points, particularly about my suggestions
in Sect. 4, which I hoped to address in an expanded version, but I never managed to
do so to my satisfaction. However, the basic issues still seem to me to be well-framed
in the original version that is printed here.
The last presentation I gave was in September 2007 at the Oxford philosophy of
mathematics seminar led by Daniel Isaacson. I was delighted that Michael Dummett
was able to attend, despite infirmities of age. (Sir Michael and I had been on warm
terms since his spring semester 1976 residence at Harvard, when he delivered the
William James Lectures from which The Logical Basis of Metaphysics [3] evolved,
and I was in my first year on the Harvard faculty.) It was particularly pleasing that
at the 2007 seminar one of the younger Oxford philosophers, Ofra Magidor, raised
the same objection that Sir Michael had framed nine years earlier in a letter to me,
namely that Counterexamples 1 and 2 (from Sect. 1) are really not worrisome at all.
In his 1998 letter he wrote, “I do not accept that your counter-examples are genuinely
such.” His point and Magidor’s was that if G and F have no atomic sentences in
common, and F has no occurrences of ⊥, then the only reason to assert F → G
would be that one had independent reason for thinking that F were false or G were
true, and since the former is ruled out by F not containing ⊥, it isn’t at all surprising
that we can infer G.
However this point seems to me mistaken: for if the rule (infer G from F → G,
when F does not contain ⊥ and G and F contain no atomic parts in common) is
justified, it is justified in application not just to assertions but also to suppositions. On
the ordinary understanding of what it is to suppose F→G, this is simply untenable. So
if the rule is to be accepted, it would have to be argued that the ordinary understanding
of supposition is incorrect, and in fact to suppose F → G is to suppose something
like “every canonical argument for F can be transformed into a canonical argument
for G”. But this is clearly wrong if F and G are empirical. (It might be maintained
for mathematical F and G, but in this case it would again appear that a bias in favor
of intuitionistic logic were being built in at the ground level.)
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Even though I was criticizing his position, Sir Michael clearly enjoyed my presen-
tation at the seminar, no doubt because he thought the issues needed more discussion.
Despite his infirmities, he maintained his famously cheerful humour as well as his
robust sense of what philosophy could aspire to do. I dedicate this publication to his
memory.
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